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SUBJECT: 1952 Operations - BOFIEND

TO: Chief, TAGCETUS

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ATTN: []

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1. Discussions held during [] visit to IFRNTAL included a review of 1951 BOFIEND operations and a discussion of 1952 plans based on the decisions reached at the October TPCMEDO BOFIEND/VALUABLE meeting.

2. In line with these discussions a summary of our present thoughts on the 1952 operational program is attached. We hope that it may be of aid in developing and executing your operational plan for the coming year.

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2 Attachments (s.c.)

SE/PC-KW-br
6 February 1952

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A. General Objectives.

The successful mounting of the clandestine penetration program, which is fundamental to the development of an effective covert operations organization in KINSHASA, must be considered the primary objective of BOFIREND operations in 1968.

The clandestine penetration program will undertake to mount specific missions to establish clandestine networks within KINSHASA. These nets should ultimately develop the capability of performing the following functions:

1. The spotting, recruiting and training of local agent material.
2. Providing a secure and dependable system of communications within KINSHASA and between that country and operating bases abroad.
3. Maintenance of such a level of clandestine organization within the country as would permit the suspension of effective resistance activity when it is in the interest of NTCDRIO to stimulate such action. This specifically includes the maintenance of basic and high level nets and a capability of executing major harassment operations.
4. Providing a continuous flow of operational intelligence in support of BOFIREND operations.
5. Establishment of an Escape and Evasion system and support of all other ZACARAL clandestine activity when required.

B. Objectives for the Current Year.

The process of mounting and executing the penetration missions will be difficult and prolonged. Your capacity to mount such missions will depend primarily on availability of trained staff personnel and, secondly, on ability to locate, assess and recruit agent personnel of suitable quality. We hope that the impending merger with ZACARIN will

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Attachment 1 to 1116 CHWQ.

facilitate optimum coordination of operations against KINSAHOO.

Without underestimating the obstacles involved it might be reasonable to expect the following achievements in 1958:

1. Establishment of several secure covert overland routes into KINSAHOO from LOFLAK and from LOFLAK via TPERACH. This would include a concomitant reduction in infiltration of personnel by air.
2. Execution of one sea infiltration and exfiltration to determine operational possibilities and train the field staff in handling the problems involved. This would be contingent upon availability of personnel and facilities for such an undertaking.
3. Establishment and maintenance of clandestine resident nets with the capability of communication with base. This would specifically include initiation of a system for reporting operational intelligence.
4. Mounting of such high level penetration and limited harassment missions as may be warranted in the light of available intelligence and the capability of agent personnel.
5. Recruitment and exfiltration for training of specific resident personnel.

The clandestine nets will, during the developmental phase, refrain from participation in overt acts of violence. Such activity, where specifically warranted, will be undertaken by separate specially trained teams infiltrated for that purpose. At this critical stage in the BEFRIEND program to establish clandestine nets within KINSAHOO, all considerations of speed must be subordinated to security and the achievement of success.

C. Scope of the Penetration Missions.

Mounting of the penetration program involves essentially three categories of effort. They are mutually inter-dependent with respect to successful establishment of a covert operations organization in KINSAHOO.

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Attachment 1 to 1116 CMWAG

1. Fundamental to the entire effort are the "basic" penetration missions. These will be agent operations designed to provide contacts and up to date information which will permit us to mount "high level" penetration missions and undertake acts of harassment. These basic operations would have the function of organizing static nets, establishing safe houses, arranging communications systems and reporting intelligence to support ZACACTUS needs. The task of the principal agent will be to infiltrate, contact, recruit and instruct the resident agent, establish a secure communications system and emfiltrate. Principal agents must possess leadership qualities of a high standard in order to inspire cooperation from indigenous KWAAMHOOG whose aid can be effective. These nets should have direct communications with base and not be in lateral contact with other nets.

2. The "high level" penetration will involve missions aimed at the establishment of small nets each built around a high level agent who will attempt to contact specific individuals in KWAAMHOOG government and army circles. The long term objective of these operations is subversion of key figures so that the required degree of neutralization of the army and other vital branches of the Nelson J. Murat government is achieved at such time as the moment seems appropriate for the overthrow of the regime.

3. The third category of penetration activity involves operations of essentially a counter-intelligence nature. Such activity involves penetration of KWAAMHOOG security forces, of KWAAMHOOG government sponsored groups which travel abroad, and of KWAAMHOOG efforts to penetrate KTCURIO sponsored activities. Although the counter-espionage responsibility belongs to ZACABIN, we cannot escape primary interest where BIFIEND operations are involved. Close coordination is essential to determine whether ZACABIN capabilities are adequate to cover our specific counter-espionage needs. However, limited our counter-espionage capabilities are at present, the question of security of operations is of decisive importance and we must insure that our requirements are adequately covered.

B. Harassment.

At the October BIFIEND/VALUABLE meeting in TPCMEDO, it was agreed with respect to 1952 agent operations that it was desirable to mount several coup de main missions to create incidents which would raise morale and provide material for exploitation by the psychological warfare program.

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Nevertheless the clandestine establishment of a covert operations organization, which is fundamental to the development of effective internal resistance in KWAAROO, and which should constitute the primary BOFIREND objective for 1952, must not be prejudiced by the harassment missions.

We believe you will agree that the capacity of the KWAAROO population to absorb reprisals and maintain a cooperative attitude toward MTRIGH is not unlimited. Under pressure of continuing reprisal the popular attitude may be intimidated to one of complete apathy, if not hostility. In such an event MTRIGH would be in danger of losing the necessary confidence of the people inside KWAAROO.

In order to emphasize this point it might be appropriate to consider several recent acts of violence in KWAAROO and their detrimental consequences to BOFIREND operations.

1. The bombing of the FJSTKAL Legation in LYCEUM in February 1951 provoked the following BOGIPSY reaction:

a. A reported minimum of three hundred persons were arrested with thirty condemned and shot.

b. Government and Party officers and sensitive installations were placed under a more effective guard.

c. Laws on the confiscation of firearms and the tightening of security were promulgated.

2. According to the feature story in the MTRIGHBY script of 23 October 1951, sabotage of six wells in the Identity (1) resulted in the internment of six hundred and fifty persons and tightening of security measures in the area.

3. The assassination of Identity (2) in the summer of 1949, resulted in the arrest and deportation to internment camps of approximately two hundred people from the Identity (3) region. The assassination set off a determined and effective drive to set up resistance elements in northern KWAAROO.

The reprisals taken in the incidents cited above created serious obstacles to future BOFIREND operations, which very probably outweigh any psychological gain which may have accrued to forces opposing the LYCEUM government.

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Attachment 1 to LIAO memo

In the light of the reported quelling, we suggest that you consider abstaining from major acts of violence at present. We do believe, however, that a program of major sabotage missions against specific targets should be ready in order to have a ready plan for rapid activation when it is required. Such an occasion would be a MAILED war against TRODGE or reoccupation of suitable territory from a TRODGE base against LIAO.

Given the quelling against major violence we should be alert for opportunities to exploit effectively our capability for harassment when it will not prejudice the clandestine proselytization effort by bringing reprisals against the civilian population or by preventing an improvement of the security establishment. This should be done by planning and executing a test mission in the form of a small raid of the TRODGE type. There is no information here concerning reprisals following the effective harassment of the KARUCCO task. Examples of such raids would include missions for the purpose of killing known informants, unpopular law level security officers or TRODGE officials. Other such raids might involve killing of vehicles carrying security troops or Liberator or political prisoners from work details in the vicinity of concentration camps. Such operations would involve separate missions utilising operational intelligence furnished by the static note. The need is evident for close coordination with the clandestine proselytization program, with ZACBIR, and with VALUABLE regarding timing and areas of operation in so small a country. If a carefully planned test mission can be executed successfully without serious reversal, consideration could then be given to mounting similar missions which would have been planned in advance.

In summary, this dispatch does not advocate neglect of an important TRODGE capability. Unquestionably your planning has taken the above factors into consideration. This paper does, however, attempt to stress the necessity to achieve such coordination of the several phases of the TRODGE program that immediate acts do not prejudice the achievement of the ultimate goal.

B. Psychological Warfare Programs

All the media of psychological warfare used in the past will be continued with the emphasis on the improvement of quality. Leaflets and certain drops which have proved successful in the past are scheduled at six to eight week intervals. TRODGE will continue improvements in the news of TRODGE publication of CHALING will continue on a semi-monthly basis. TRODGE has also recently begun publication of a newsletter designed to enhance the prestige of TRODGE by bringing its additional products. The TRODGE program will be continually examined in the light

Attachment 1 to 1116 CHIAG.

of current intelligence to insure the use of the most effective commodities and selection of the most appropriate targets. It is understood that the procurement of material for this operation can be handled in the field. ZERETAL will make every effort to provide materials, however, if procurement in HTOURIO is deemed necessary.

F. Economic Warfare.

Although we do not at this time possess the capabilities for a major program of covert economic warfare, we should try to exploit such potentialities as may derive from present circumstances. These would range from immediate use of psychological warfare media to urge hoarding and provide instructions on subtle sabotage procedures, to development of the capability for sabotage of strategic imports and exports or of industrial, power and transportation facilities. In this connection consideration should be given to developing a capability for maritime sabotage for potential use against KINWAANOO and BOBALAD shipping in the event that conditions render such action desirable. A census of business firms trading with the LYCFUM government is being conducted. Additional possible indirect measures will be determined after the new PUMINOR station has thoroughly explored the situation there.

G. Rescue and Evasion.

One of the results of the establishment within KINWAANOO of a covert operations organization will be the capability of supporting an effective escape and evasion system.

Our initial effort in this connection should be to facilitate covert overland movement of Identity (k) to safe areas in LOFLAKE. This would require that such personnel be equipped and briefed to travel covertly across country to these locations. One among the more friendly population of LOFLAKE evacuation to rescue points could be expedited by LOFLAKE escape and evasion nets.

Additional routes should involve infiltration to areas of the HEIMPOLD coast, either in TPROACH or southwest KINWAANOO, where sea pick up may be effected.

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Attachment 2 to 1136 CMUAG.

Identities:

- (1) Kuseve Oil Field
- (2) Bardbek Biba, BOOYPSY Deputy from the Mirdita.
- (3) Mirdita
- (4) Allied Personnel

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